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An Analysis of Standardized Versus Relationship 
Bank Lending to Small Firms'*'
Polly T. Hardee, Ph.D.’ 
University of Houston
Using the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances and banking data to produce a bank- 
firm match, the author tests for evidence of standardized versus relationship lending methods in 
both total bank credit as well as credit emanating from the firm’s most important source of 
financial services, its primary bank. The author employs a two step Heckman procedure to test 
the likelihood a small firm has bank debt, then conditional upon having debt, the level of credit 
outstanding. By comparing the determinates of bank and firm characteristics of primary bank 
credit with credit from all bank sources, the author finds relationship lending inherent within 
the primary bank, whereas competing bank sources employ standardized lending techniques 
such as credit scoring. Relating to credit availabihty, however, no clear dominance of one 
method over the other prevails, though empirical support is evident in primary banks providing 
more favorable credit conditions for riskier firms.
As banking consolidation and technological innovation continue in the financial 
services industry, there exists an evident dichotomy in the manner in which commercial banks 
mitigate the information asymmetry between borrows and lenders in the small business loan 
market. This dichotomy—the production technique most appropriate for supplying funds to 
small firms—is primarily a function of the structure of the banking organization. The
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technique dramatically differs in large organizations as compared to their smaller counterpart 
It arises, in part, due to the nature of the small firm loan market. Inherent in small business 
lending is a more pronounced information asymmetry, since small firms are more opaque than 
relatively transparent large firms. The comparative advantage small banks have enjoyed in 
small business loans due to this opacity has been eroded by technological advances allowing 
for more efficient information gathering. Consequently, large organizations have made marked 
inroads into this loan category. Since most borrowing of small firms are through commercial 
banks (Bitler, Robb and Wolken, 2001; Ang, 1991), the supplying of loanable funds by 
essentially two divergent production techniques is important.
On the one hand large banks are primarily making loans to small firms by standardized 
methods. This transaction-based technique includes financial statement lending, asset-based 
lending and credit scoring. That is, loans are extended in this market based on a production 
function determining creditworthiness from “hard” information. This hard information is 
fumished by the firm in the loan application process, or is obtainable from other sources such 
as the bank’s own credit file of the firm, or from a computerized loan-evaluation system 
referred to as credit scoring. It is a type of retail banking, analogous to consumer lending, and 
the process is generally impersonal. Due to economies of scale, the cost to the large bank is 
relatively low compared to more personal, labor-intensive information gathering.
On the other hand, the small bank typically engages in what has been termed 
relationship lending. The bank’s smaller scale generally prevents standardized lending from 
being cost effective. Thus, the information asymmetry between borrower and lender is 
narrowed not solely by hard, quantitative data reflected in the firm’s credit score, financial 
ratios or collateral pledges; but is bridged by “soft” information gathered over more subjective 
processes during the course of the bank’s relationship with the small firm. For example, it is 
developed through personal interaction with firm owners and bank loan officers; through the 
firm’s use of pre-existing bank products; the firm’s reputation in the community; or the bank’s 
knowledge of the local market. The gathering of this soft information underlies the relationship 
lending technique used by small banking organizations, and makes their production function in 
the small business loan market strikingly different from large ones.
Before technology advancements in credit scoring spurred standardized lending, small 
business credit was the province of small banks. Now, as the use credit scoring has become 
more prevalent, small banks no longer dominate the arena of small firm debt. And with 
continued consolidation in the financial service industry, the number of small banks is 
shrinking. Therefore, considering inroads forged by large banks through standardized lending, 
this portion of the small business loan market may have a different face. Thus with fewer small 
banks employing relationship lending coupled with small firms being a strong engine of 
economic growth, the policy question that arises is, “Will the small business loan market be 
adequately served?”.
This question is addressed herein, with pertinent literature noted in section (1.) as well 
as throughout the paper. Section (2.) contains the data description and competing hypotheses. 
Section (3) presents the model and empirical methodology used in the analytical framework, 
followed by the results (4), and finally the conclusion and policy implications (5). Overall the 
findings show that relationship lending is prevalent in the primary bank, with additional bank
 ^The banking organization refers to the consolidated bank holding company, which may encompass more than 
one bank, all operating under holding company policy. If no multi-bank holding company exists, the banking 
organization is essentially the bank itself. Consequently, banking organization and banks are used interchangeably 
throughout this paper.
sources using standardized methods. Also, primary banks reflect improved credit to firms with 
low credit ratings and those recently declaring bankruptcy.
I. Literature Review
Many studies have found that small banks have an advantage in small firm lending 
(Carter and McNulty 2005; Craig and Hardee, 2001; Peek and Rosengren, 1998). This is 
especially evident in the area of relationship loans, or loans to firms not producing sufficient 
hard information for standardized lending practices (Cole, Goldberg and White, 2004; Scott, 
2004; Berger and Udell, 2002; Berger, et al, 2002). Consequently, DeYoung, Hunter and Udell 
(2004) project the future banking industry will be divided between very large banks 
specializing in the use of hard information to make standardized loans, and small banks 
specializing in the use of soft information and customer relationships to make non-standardized 
loans.
Although the above citations support small banks’ proclivity in relationship lending, 
there is disparity in other research results. For instance, Strahan and Weston (1998) find that 
there is no difference in credit availability to small firms from changes in banking system 
structure and its underlying loan production processes; while Hancock, Peek and Wilcox 
(2004) find that as banks consolidate under the fifty largest holding companies, total small 
business lending is reduced. Others show that reductions in small business lending from 
consolidation are offset by de novo banks^ (Goldberg and DeYoung, 1999; Goldberg and 
White, 1998), and by other types of financial institutions (Berger, Miller, Rajan and Stein, 
2002; Berger, Goldberg and White, 2001). Conversely some analysts find that credit to small 
firms have improved with the advent of credit scoring models offered by large banks, 
particularly with marginal credits (Berger, Frame and Miller, 2004). Also, with these 
technological improvements, large banks are finding a niche in making smaller loans amenable 
to credit scoring (Levonian, 1997; Mester, 1997); while small banks are capturing more of the 
larger loans to small firms (Ely and Robinson, 2001). Furthermore, Frame, Padhi and Woosley 
(2004) find that credit scoring by large banks improved credit availability to small firms in low- 
and moderate- income areas. Finally, other research indicates non-bank financial institutions 
are making headway in the small business loan market (Cole and Wolken, 1996), and more 
particularly so with riskier credits (Craig and Hardee, 2007).
II. Data and Competing Hypotheses
A. Data
Given the divergence of prior findings, this research reexamines this issue using 
proprietary data not available to researchers outside the small business section within the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, thus illuminating the evidence in a much more direct 
fashion. The proprietary data, extracted from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances 
(Survey), allow the authorized researcher to identify at the firm level, the organizational 
structure of the bank used for financial products and the characteristics of the firm. That is, in 
this project the individual small firm data from the Survey are combined with banking data 
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) Summary of Deposits to get a 
bank/firm match."  ^ Banking data is as of December 31, 1998, the date of the majority of the 
firms’ fiscal year end.
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 ^De novo banks are new entrants into the banking industry.
Only onsite analysts from the Small Business Section at the Board of Governors are authorized to match the 
firms in the Survey with data on the bank providers. Accordingly, Traci L. Mach, completed the bank/firm match, 
provided data for Table I and as well as all of the regression output reflected in Tables II through VI.
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The Survey is a nationally representative, weighted sample of small firms operating in 
the U.S. as of year-end 1998.^ Of the 3,561 firms included in the Survey, 2 , 2 0 2  carry debt from 
a financial institution, of which 1695 firms have bank debt. The financial institution debt 
emanates from depository institutions, mortgage companies, finance and leasing companies, 
brokerage houses, and insurance companies. It includes various loan products, exclusive of 
credit cards. Namely these are six different credit instruments: Lines of Credit, Mortgages, 
Equipment Loans, Motor Vehicle Loans, Capital Leases and Other Loans—loans not of the 
preceding types (primarily unsecured term loans).
Commercial banks, savings banks and savings & loans constitute suppliers of bank debt 
and are what is termed “bank(s)” in this paper. Credit unions are excluded as a bank, since they 
are not FDIC insured, thus are not part of the deposit data, and constitute a minimal of financial 
institution debt (Bitler, Robb and Wolken, 2001). Out of the 3,561 total firms included in the 
Survey, 70 did not have a bank-firm match—i.e., either they did not use a bank for financial 
services or the institution could not be identified. Thus the sample size is 3,491 with 1680 
firms reflecting bank debt.
Table I reflects the weighted and un-weighted mean and median firm debt from all 
financial institutions as well as debt from banks by banking organization (holding company) 
size. The debt is the aggregate at the firm level of the above six credit instruments. From 
Table I we see average loan size increases as the assets of the banking organization increase. 
Although this is a function of regulatory lending limits that generally increase with bank size, it 
is interesting to note that the median firm debt for the largest organizations—over 1 0  billion in 
total assets—is lower than those with assets of only $500 million to $1 billion—a manifestation 
which may be attributed to credit scoring in the large institutions.
Thus this project contributes to the research community by testing actual bank credit of 
small firms, analyzing it from the perspective of all sources as well as the firm’s primary bank. 
The latter is determined in the Survey, and represents that bank which the firm considers as its 
most important source of financial services.
B. Competing Hypotheses
The competing hypotheses follow the lines that large, more complex bank organizations 
primarily lend to small firms qualifying under the standardized (credit scoring) criteria whereas 
small, more simply structured banks lend to firms falling under the umbrella of relationships. 
These hypotheses have theoretical underpinnings of hierarchical control expostulated by 
Williamson (1967).
On the one hand, Williamson posited as an organization increases in size, it loses 
control between successive hierarchies. As mandated policies and procedures are transmitted 
to successive hierarchal levels, distortions increase. Consequently, a large, complex banking 
organization needs explicit guidelines of the standardized lending process to avoid deviation 
from mandates and resultant managerial diseconomies of scale. On the other hand, the smaller 
organization is less complex, or flat, allowing loan officers far more discretion in the approval 
process. Thus the organization ferrets out problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
based on relationship lending. This research empirically measures the effects of these two 
lending techniques on credit availability via the model and methodology discussed below.
 ^The Survey data contain the sample weights that are constructed from the universe of small firms listed in Dun & 
Bradstreet’s (D & B) market Identifier File, a national register of small firms estimated to have about 93% of small 
businesses in the U.S.(Bitler, Robb & Wolken, 2001). The weights are designed to reflect from the sample the 
target population of all U.S. small businesses as listed by D & B.
III. Model and Empirical Methodology
A. General Model
The model utilizes a two-step Heckman process at the firm level to control for sample 
selection estimation bias.^ The first step estimates the probability of a small firm obtaining 
credit, while the second step estimates normalized levels of credit for those firms having debt. 
A Heckman analysis is employed because there are reasons to consider that the decision 
whether to carry debt may have separate components than the decision concerning the level of 
debt. That is, the incentives to the financial institution provider in supplying credit may not be 
consistent with the demand preferences for debt by firms. For example, small businesses may 
respond to the banking environment by considering whether they want to deal with a large, 
impersonal institution, or instead with a small community bank organization. Furthermore, 
viable small firms may be rejected in the standardized loan application process due to non­
consideration of soft information. But if approved, the cost savings of larger institutions from 
economies of scale may be passed on through loan pricing, as found by Berger and Udell 
(1996). Thus, conditional on surviving the loan approval process, the amount borrowed may 
actually rise if credit is less expensive. This may affect the level of debt differently from the 
probability of debt (Craig and Hardee, 2007). Thus the two steps in the loan approval process 
are modeled separately. The first step models the probability the firm has bank credit using a 
Probit specification. The general form is as follows:
Debt = / (bank market identification variables, firm characteristics) (1)
This first step (equation 1) captures the results of a reduced form outcome dependent on 
the decision of a small firm to apply for debt, and the decision by a bank to approve that 
application. Here all of the bank-matched firms in the Survey are tested, each weighted to 
mimic the U.S. small business population. The second step in equation (2) expresses the level 
of credit conditional on debt.
Debt levels= f (bank structure variables, firm characteristics) (2)
Thus by explicitly modeling the decision process of how much bank debt the firm 
assumes as a separate step from the decision to carry this debt, the differences in 
lending/borrowing behavior at both stages of the funding process are captured.^
B. Dependent Variables
The dependent variables in our model are bank debt as measured by credit limits, 
inclusive of un-drawn lines of credit, and outstanding bank loan balances (which exclude 
unused credit). This debt is normalized by the firm’s total revenue. The dependent variables 
are reflected by total bank debt and primary bank debt to isolate the behavior of determinants 
from bank sources other than the firm’s primary bank. Literature supports this methodology in 
that Thakor (1996) demonstrated the existence of multiple bank sources reduces the value of 
information acquisition by any one bank. Petersen and Raj an (1994) demonstrated multiple 
lenders increase price and reduce credit availability to small firms. Cole, Goldberg, and White
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 ^The Heckman process by design is in two steps, and is a specific econometric estimation technique that is suited 
to this model. By employing it, the results are more reflective of the data.
 ^This would be lost under a Tobit model, which assumes that the decision to carry debt is identical to the decision 
regarding the debt level.
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(2004) find multiple lending sources decrease the likelihood of small firms’ loan approvals. 
Thus the effects of multiple bank sources are reflected in the total bank credit regression.
Further rationale for examining primary bank credit apart from total debt is based on the 
primary bank being the predominant repository of the firm’s private and soft information. 
Unlike large public-traded firms that have readily available information, a small firm has 
private information and much of it is soft, based on the character and reputation of the owner. 
The primary bank is privy to this, consequently should have a comparative advantage in 
obtaining private information vis-a-vis other banks. Two studies supporting this argument are 
Scott (2004) and Shin, Fraser, and Kolari (2003). Thus the primary bank will be more inclined 
to employ relationship lending, whereas secondary sources of credit, short on soft information, 
may be employing standardized lending.
C. Independent Variables
The independent variables relate to structure of the bank market for the first step in the 
model, where the firms having bank debt are identified through a Probit or selection procedure. 
The individual bank structure is used in the second step of the model, which linearly tests levelsQ _ • •
of debt conditional upon the firm having a bank loan. The same firm characteristics are used 
in both steps.
Market and bank structure variables have been used to identify relationship lending or 
standardized lending in several studies, such as those cited previously regarding organizational 
size. Organizational complexity studies by Keeton (1995, 1996) find that banks with a high 
degree of branching and multi-bank holding companies (MBHC) hinder small business lending, 
a phenomenon Nakamura (1994) attributes to informational diseconomies of scale. Goldberg 
and DeYoung (1999) hypothesize multi-bank holding company structure is particularly 
inimical to small business lending because it adds extra layers of bureaucracy. However, Stein 
(2 0 0 2 ) argues decentralized hierarchy ease informational flow providing incentives for more 
efficient capital allocation. By deduction, MBHCs would more readily gather soft information 
thereby fostering small business lending.
Relating to bank markets Peterson and Raj an (1994) find that banks in more 
competitive markets make fewer loans to un-established small firms due to informational 
deficiencies. Also in another paper Peterson and Rajan (1995) suggest small banks in more 
concentrated markets^ invest in loan relationships due to higher assurance the borrower will 
switch to a competitor. In contrast, Jarayante and Wolken (1999) find small firms in areas with 
only a few small banks did not suffer lack of credit in the long run, though did experience short 
run disruptions. This paper builds on these concepts by utilizing market and bank structure 
measures in the model.
Consequently, the identification variables employed in the first step (equation 1) focus 
on the bank market. These variables are based on the assumptions about firms’ borrowing 
decisions. That is, firms would decide whether or not to borrow based on average 
characteristics of the local market of potential lenders, but once they had made the decision to 
borrow, the level would be determined by the characteristics of the actual financial institution 
the firm chose. Accordingly, the identification variables are the average banking characteristics
 ^A Probit or selection procedure in the first step of the Heckman process determines the probability if a firm has 
bank debt, by assigning a value of one to firms with this debt and zero otherwise. Thus only firms carrying bank 
debt (selected firms) are considered in the second step. This two-step estimation is the essence of the Heckman 
process.
 ^Concentrated markets are those with few, if any, competing banks.
of the local market—i.e., the MSA for urban firms and the county for rural firms, a definition 
commonly accepted in the literature (Amel and Brevoort, 2004). The identification variables 
used are average banking organizations assets, percent of banks in multi-bank holding 
companies (MBHC), percent of unit (no-branch) banks*® and bank market concentration,
as measured by a Herfindahl index of bank deposits within the local market.
The bank structure variables used in the second step (for levels of credit conditional on 
having debt) capture the structure of multiple bank sources in the total bank credit regression. 
A separate regression does the same for the firm’s primary bank. The source bank structure 
variables are continuous except where noted by a flag, in which case they are dichotomous; for 
more than one bank source, an average is used. They are the following:
Miles to bank: Peterson and Rajan (2000) find small firms are borrowing at greater 
distances due not only to bank consolidations but also because of an increase in bank 
productivity. Thus this variable tests for standardized lending via credit scored, on-line 
borrowing.
Years with bank: Soft information gathered in relationship lending may increase over 
time, although Cole (1998) found the benefits of relationships to accrue within one year. 
Earlier papers using data from previous Surveys^ ^  show the longer the relationship, the greater 
the credit availability to small firms (Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
However, Cole, Goldberg and White (2004) using the 1993 Survey find no evidence of 
duration of the relationship improving the probability of a small firm’s loan approval by a bank. 
Given the mixed evidence, this variable at a minimum acts as a control and may indicate telling 
evidence of relationship lending improving credit availability.
Log of banking organization assets: The natural log of the assets of the bank holding 
company or single bank (when no holding company structure exists) is used to distinguish the 
impact on firm credit between large organizations using standardized methods and small ones 
using relationships. Because of the wide range in asset size, the natural log is used to minimize 
problems of heteroscadasticity. The size of the organization rather than the size of the bank is 
employed to incorporate the effects of lending policy set at the holding company level.
Unit bank flag: This is a test for complexity of branch banks using standardized 
l end ing .Tha t  is, soft information may be more easily processed in a unit bank with its stand­
alone location than through the various locations of branch banks. Thus when other than the 
primary bank furnish credit, standardized lending techniques may be employed, since that type 
of lending would be more amenable to branch rather that unit banks.
MBHC flag: This also is a test for organizational complexity, although the literature 
previously cited has shown mixed findings.
The firm characteristics include variables that allow for distinction between relationship 
and standardized bank lending. These include size (by number of workers); age of firm; 
minority ownership; and type of industry. Also used are financial variables of profit
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance & Business Ventures. Vol. 12, Iss. 3 29
Unit banks are stand-alone facilities having no branches—i.e., all the bank operations are “housed” in one 
location. They can be members of a multi-bank or one-bank holding company or just exist without a holding 
company structure. The distinguishing feature of a unit bank is than it has no branches.
Surveys of small business finance conducted by Federal Reserve Board of Governors cover data relating first to 
1987, followed by 1993, then 1998 (the Survey used in this paper), and finally the most recent, 2003.
The degree of branching is actually a better test of branching organizational complexity, since many small, 
simply structured banks have branches. However, due to multi-collinearity with size, and size being the preferred 
variable, we apply this cruder test. Again, a unit bank is one with no branch facilities. Multi-collinearity of 
variables implies the variables have such similar effects, that they dampen their individual influence.
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(normalized by firm assets) and sales growth of the firm^^, credit history variables such as the 
firm and principal owner’s bankruptcies, the firm’s Dunn & Bradstreet credit score. These 
variables encompass hard information used in standardized lending, in contrast to the collection 
of soft information collected over time through the firm/lender relationship—^proprietary 
knowledge not easily transmitted to or verified by other lenders.
If the hypotheses hold, evidence of relationship lending will be predominant in small, 
more simply structured banking organizations and the standardized (credit scoring) methods in 
large ones. Accordingly, firm characteristics will delineate lending methods through marginal 
or riskier firms with more soft information assumed by relationship lending and sounder firms 
with presumably hard, quantifiable information assumed by its counterpart. The distinction 
will be further clarified by comparing the results of multiple bank sources with that of the 
primary bank. Table II contains a complete list of all the variables, independent and dependent, 
including brief descriptions and means.
IV. Results
Statistically significant signs on the banking variables, market and firm specific, 
along with firm characteristics reveal if relationship or standardized lending prevails. Implicit 
in the model is the assumption that firms drawing on lines of credit are more cash constrained 
than firms carrying un-drawn lines of credit. If true, then the results on credit limits highlight 
firms that have more cash flow than the results on credit balances. Accordingly, one sees more 
differences in the outcome between primary and total bank credit in the balance results than the 
limit results, particularly with the firm characteristics. Furthermore, the efficacy of the 
Heckman procedure is confirmed by the signs switching on some significant variables, thus 
reflecting different behavior in debt probability versus debt levels.
A detailed discussion of the results is presented below under the two competing 
hypotheses. Unless otherwise noted, the statistical significance on the coefficients is the same 
in the marginal results. Since the interest is in the qualitative rather than quantitative outcome, 
the focus is on the coefficients as reflected in Tables III A and III B, rather than the marginal 
effects.
Basically one finds much more statistical significance in the likelihood of having credit 
than in the levels of credit. Evidence of standardized lending prevails when competing banks 
are involved in the provision of credit and relationship lending when only primary bank credit 
is considered. Although the evidence is inconclusive in determining if one method over the 
other improves credit availability, primary banks improve credit to firms with low credit ratings 
or recent bankruptcy.
A. Comparison of effects of total bank credit to primary bank credit
Under the competing hypotheses, initially the bank variables’ impact on the likelihood 
of a firm having bank credit is discussed, since this represents the selection aspect of our 
model. Next the impact of source bank structure on credit levels conditional on a firm having 
bank debt is analyzed. The focus is initially on the banking structure, since the impact of bank 
consolidation on small firm finance is the main area of concern among policymakers. The
The Survey data only reflect current and prior year sales. Consequently this is a dummy variable (flag) equaling 
one if the current year’s sales are greater than prior year, and zero otherwise. For firm’s not having or reporting 
prior year’s sales we use a zero. Other variables in the firm characteristics represented by a discrete zero-one 
dummy variable (flag) are: minority ownership, type of industry and bankruptcy.
Marginal results are furnished upon request.
impact of firm characteristics on likelihood and levels of credit are covered together, since 
these variables are the same in both regressions.
A. 1. Banking variables’ impact on likelihood of credit:
Except for the Herfindahl index, the outcome of these variables is the same for both 
primary and total bank credit. Bank market characteristics are initially analyzed, then source 
bank characteristics.
Bank Market Characteristics:
In the likelihood regression bank size matters, and illuminates the competing 
hypotheses. That is as the average bank organization size in the market increases, firms are 
less likely to have credit limits. This lends support to relationship lending in that the size of the 
bank organization may dampen the likelihood of small firms having credit due to informational 
diseconomies of scale.
As the percentage of unit banks increase in the bank market, the likelihood of a firm 
having credit is negative and significant. Since conceptually it is easier to process soft 
information in a unit bank where all operations are under one roof, this negative result is 
support for standardized lending. That method would be easier to administer in a branch bank, 
with offices conceivably located across different markets. This outcome coupled with the 
result of unit banks decreasing the levels of credit limits with total bank credit (as further 
discussed in the levels section) is evidence for competing branch banks employing standardized 
lending.
Additionally, standardized lending is supported in the likelihood regression by the result 
on MBHCs. Firms in bank markets with higher percentages of MBHCs show a greater 
probability of having credit. Analogous to branch banks, banking organizations with multiple 
banks in the holding company structure, presumably would find standardized lending more 
efficient. However, as pointed out in the section below, when the bank is the primary bank, 
membership in a MBHC produces lower levels of credit, supporting relationship lending.
The outcome on the Herfindahl index is negative and significant in primary bank credit 
limits, indicating that these markets with increased competition are likely to have higher 
probabilities of having debt. (The lower the index, the more competitive the market.) This 
supports the principle that competition improves product availability, particularly with primary 
credit. The lack of significance of this variable with total bank credit may indicate an Internet 
supply of fiinds from sources via standardized methods outside the banking market. That is, 
banks supplying funds on-line are not in the Herfindahl index unless they have a brick and 
mortar office in the local market. Or it just may indicate that the multiple bank sources apart 
from the primary bank are those that have a more concentrated share of market deposits, 
thereby abrogating the negative significance.
A.2. Banking variables’ impact on levels of credit:
Source Bank Characteristics:
Years the firm has been with the bank is negative and significant in the primary bank 
regressions (limits and balances) but not with the average years in total banks. This indicates 
that with the primary lender, shorter durations improve credit relationships, and indirectly 
confirms the findings of Cole (1998). This is supportive of relationship lending in that the 
primary bank can take the risk of increasing loan levels to firms more rapidly, given that it has 
more private information on the firm as its primary institution. And the significance is even 
greater in the primary balance regressions, which presumably highlight relatively cash 
constrained firms. But as evidenced in the total bank regressions, when competing bank 
organizations provide additional funds, the relationship is clouded, thus the number of years the
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firm has been with the competing sources does not impact the loan levels. This result supports 
the effect of relationships in the primary bank to more readily supply fimds.
Unit banks is negative and significant in the total banks credit limits (not balances), but 
not in the primary banks regressions. In some respects, this lends support to relationship 
lending, in that the level of primary credit is not as affected by branch versus unit bank 
structure as that with competing bank providers. However, when other banks are involved, unit 
banks provide lower debt levels relative to branch banks. Therefore, the evidence points to 
branch banks, when providing additional sources of credit, have higher debt levels. By 
inference, these banks likely use standardized lending. (This is further supported by the 
outcome of the percentage of unit banks in the market, discussed in the likelihood section 
above.) Furthermore, the variable for unit banks interacted with organizational size in the total 
bank credit limits is positive and significant, providing evidence of credit scoring in unit banks 
associated with large bank holding companies.
A primary bank in a MBHC is negative and significant in the balance regression. The 
use of additional layers of bureaucracy may make the primary institution more complex, thus 
lowering the loan balance. This is supportive of relationship lending in accordance with 
Williamson’s organizational hierarchy (1967) and Goldberg and DeYoung (1999). As other 
bank sources provide credit, this organizational form does not matter, giving evidence of 
standardized lending used with the competing sources.
B. Firm characteristics likelihood and levels of Bank credit:
Firm Characteristics:
As with the banking variables, overall we find evidence of relationship lending in the 
primary bank credit and standardized practices in the other bank sources. This is more 
pronounced in the balance regressions, which again may reflect more cash constrained firms.
For firm age, the youngest third of firms (from zero to seven years) have less 
likelihood of obtaining credit for both total and primary banks limits but only for total bank 
balances. The lack of statistical significance in the primary balances is weak support for the 
primary bank’s ability to process soft information that reduces the risk associated with new 
firms. That is, younger firms may be considered riskier, since they are less established. The 
middle third, (firm age 8 - 1 6  years), have a higher probability of obtaining credit relative to 
the oldest firms with total banks, but not in the primary bank regressions. In summary, the 
primary bank does not make the distinctions with firm age to the extent of the other sources. 
This may be attributed to the power of relationship lending overcoming the risks of less 
established entities.
Although firm size shows that the largest has more likelihood of obtaining credit from 
both primary and competing sources, there is different behavior in the levels. Namely, the 
smallest third of firms as measured by total employees (zero - three) is positive and 
significant for the total banks in both the limits and balance regressions.^^ (It is negative and 
significant in the likelihood regressions, thus reinforcing the Heckman methodology capturing 
this different behavior.) Although these smallest and perhaps riskier firms have lower 
probabilities of obtaining credit, once credit is approved, the levels extended by the other 
source banks are greater. This outcome supports the literature that credit scoring is making 
inroads into the market for business loans less than $100,000 (Mester, 1997; Ely and Robinson,
15 The marginal effects indicate this variable is significant at the 10% level, thus weakens the outcome of the 
coefficient.
The significance goes away in the marginal effects for levels of credit balances fi-om all banks.
2001). That is, it is reasonable to surmise these smallest of firms have smaller loans, a 
conclusion that implies firm size gives evidence of credit scoring.
For minority-owned firms one finds in all regressions that there is less likelihood these 
firms will carry bank credit, but sees evidence of relationship lending in the levels. 
Specifically, the level of balances is relatively higher at the primary bank. Here one may 
surmise that the relationship aspect allows for higher balances with this group of borrowers.
A strong indicator of relationship lending in the primary bank is the results on the D & 
B credit score as well as bankruptcy. In the balance regression, the likelihood of a lower 
rated firm obtaining credit is higher. That is, the higher the score, the better the credit. Thus in 
the primary relation, lower ranked riskier firms have more of a chance obtaining a loan, but not 
when competing banks provide credit. These banks are likely to produce a low credit score on 
their own system, thus reject these presumably cash constrained firms in their standardized 
lending. In the bankruptcy variable one sees a similar outcome. No distinction is made 
between firms or their owners declaring bankruptcy by the primary bank, whereas when 
competing banks are considered, these firms are less likely to have a loan balance. (In terms of 
credit limits, which include un-drawn lines of credit, bankruptcy decreases the chance of a firm 
obtaining credit at the primary and competing banks.) Taken together the credit rating and 
bankruptcy results reflect more favorable credit conditions granted by the primary bank to 
riskier firms; and by deduction, these banks would likely be using relationship lending.
Basic principles of finance are evidenced in the results for profit as well as sales 
growth, but do not shed light on the competing hypotheses. Here we find, as expected, more 
profitable firms and those with one-year sales growth are more likely to obtain credit, 
particularly in the limits. However, in the primary balances profit does not matter in the loan 
level, but is negatively significant in total banks balances. One may interpret this as less 
profitable firms are extended higher balances in the standardized lending scheme. Growing 
sales have lower balances in the primary banks in these possibly cash constrained firms, while 
the more cash flush firms of credit limits show lower levels in the total banks.
Although within the industry types, there is different behavior between the primary and 
total bank regressions no conclusive interpretations are made under the competing hypotheses. 
However, it is interesting to observe that firms involved in the real estate or transportation 
industry have a higher likelihood of being selected for credit when competing banks were 
involved, but not with primary banks. This may be indicative of firms in the then growing real 
estate industry—a desirable market at the time of the data—obtaining additional credit from 
other bank sources.
V. Conclusion and Policy Implications
This research employs the fruitful data of the Survey of Small Business Finances 
coupled with proprietary data identifying the firm’s financial source to ferret out standardized 
versus relationship lending in bank credit. Overall, one finds strong evidence that relationship 
lending is inherent in primary banks and standardized lending in other bank providers. 
Although no conclusive evidence exists indicating that one lending technique is dominant in 
improving credit availability, primary banks do seem more favorably inclined toward lower 
rated credits.
In terms of the competing hypotheses, this research provides substantive evidence of the 
impact of two diverse lending techniques. That one method is not apparently better in overall 
credit availability has significant policy implications. It is possible that the changes in the 
banking industry and the resulting changes in small business finance are efficient in this 
market. That is, credit may be adequate due to the primary banks’ niche in relationship 
lending, as large more complex banking organizations supplement supply via standardized
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methods. Furthermore, these large bank suppliers may be the primary bank, and augment 
standardized techniques with the benefits of proprietary relationship information. Thus, opaque 
but viable small firms may face sufficient credit availability in an environment of improved 
lending technologies and changing financial intermediary structure. Hence, the market, if 
allowed to function freely, efficiently allocates adequate financing to small firms regardless of 
the supplier’s lending methodology.
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Table IA
Firms’ Outstanding Balances By Size Of Banking Organization
Firm Debt bv Bank Or2un. Size: I Jn-weiehted Firm Debt Weighted Firm Debt
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
Firms’ Credit balances with all 
Financial Institutions 845,884 69,150 229,537 35,000
Firms’ CREDIT balances with all 
banking organizations 762,416 85,000 226,741 37,000
CREDIT BALANCE—Unclassified^ 627,906 39,350 149,015 20,000
Asset Size of Banking Organization
Under 25 Million 82,574 21,000 45,926 8,232
25 to 50 Million 196,148 60,000 148,878 60,000
50 to 100 Million 169,371 43,865 71,341 24,500
100 to 300 Million 238,419 81,500 126,182 48,000
300 to 500 Million 308,404 74,226 164,455 35,000
500 Million to IBiUion 259,224 62,447 147,409 45,000
Firm Debt to Bank Org. with 
Assets 1 Billion or less 255,125 65,491 136,714 44,950
Bank Assets IB to 3B 496,418 91,000 234,597 50,000
Bank Assets 3B to lOB 502,066 77,335 215,434 30,000
Bank Assets Over lOB 937,963 61,789 247,382 28,985
Firm Debt to Bank Org. with 
Assets Greater than 1 Billion 873,955 76,831 251,792 31,600
Firms’ CREDIT BALANCES with all 
primary institutions 790,246 83,670 234,618 33,028
Firms’ CREDIT BALANCES with all 
primary banking organizations 808,183 90,784 236,227 38,000
CREDIT BALANCE-PRIMARY 
BANK, Unclassified^ 1,007,779 108,469 217,764 32,080
Primary Bank Organ. Asset Size 
Under 25 Million 68,563 27,500 54,774 31,000
25 to 50 Million 209,371 107,076 200,225 127,000
50 to 100 Million 208,572 60,239 74,037 20,000
100 to 300 Million 276,208 98,500 145,241 55,000
300 to 500 Million 415,304 98,000 223,878 48,000
500 MiUion to 1 Billion 327,125 60,423 149,902 38,000
Firm Debt to Primary Bank 
Organization Assets 1 Billion or less 292,510 94,556 149,492 48,000
Primary Bank Assets 1 to 3 Billion 551,154 111,500 242,423 61,972
Primary Bank Assets 3 to 10 Billion 570,316 90,500 228,668 33,560
Primary Bank Assets Over 10 Billion 1,154,196 88,000 297,090 30,000
Firm Debt to Primary Bank 
Organization Assets Greater than 1 
Billion 1,003,925 90,000 281,344 32,000
 ^ Unclassified implies that the size of the banking organization could not be determined, since it was unidentified 
in the bank-firm match.
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Table I B
Firms’ Outstanding Credit Limits By Size Of Banldng Organization
Firm Debt bv Bank Organ. Size: 
Variable
Firms’ Credit limits with all Financial
Un-weighted Firm Debt
Mean Median
Weighted Firm Debt 
Mean Median
Institutions 1,167,270 98,139 322,244 48,718
Firms’ CREDIT LIMITS with all
banking organizations 1,089,430 103,535 329,696 50,000
CREDIT LIMIT—Unclassified' 891,756 50,000 287,338 30,000
Asset Size of Banking Organization
Under 25 Million 81,210 25,000 53,326 15,000
25 to 50 Million 214,701 76,259 163,240 72,518
50 to 100 Million 203,197 45,000 98,583 25,000
100 to 300 Million 286,278 98,000 143,831 50,000
300 to 500 Million 368,899 85,500 180,580 25,000
500 Milhon to IBilhon 357,568 105,000 181,310 65,000
Total o f Firm Debt to Bank Org. with
Assets 1 Billion or less 314,520 96,500 159,241 50,000
Bank Assets IB to 3B 615,193 111,000 267,924 50,000
Bank Assets 3B to lOB 680,384 100,000 322,391 50,000
Bank Assets Over lOB 1,375,941 91,000 367,542 46,000
Total o f Firm Debt to Bank Org. with
Assets Greater than 1 Billion 1,266,132 100,000 364,587 50,000
Firms’ CREDIT LIMITS with all
primary institutions 1,110,574 100,000 333,079 50,000
Firms’ CREDIT LIMITS with all
primary banking organizations 1,138,353 109,215 342,637 50,000
CREDIT LIMIT-PRIMARY BANK,
Unclassified' 1,370,395 144,000 438,005 50,000
Primary Bank Orsan. Asset Size
Under 25 Million 67,709 25,000 60,261 31,000
25 to 50 Million 232,874 117,038 212,186 127,000
50 to 100 Million 237,346 60,000 97,477 25,000
100 to 300 Million 333,583 107,953 162,797 63,000
300 to 500 Million 488,717 121,500 240,843 48,000
500 Milhon to IBiUion 431,765 107,347 186,453 64,000
Firm Debt to Primary Bank
Organization Assets I Billion or less 352,918 100,000 169,998 53,460
Primary Bank Assets 1 to 3 Bilhon 721,756 129,000 295,728 50,000
Primary Bank Assets 3 to 10 BiUion 755,760 140,000 356,174 60,000
Primary Bank Assets Over 10 Billion 1,668,878 106,765 435,149 50,000
Firm Debt to Primary Bank 
Organization Assets Greater than 1
Billion 1,439,246 114,034 407,797 50,000
' Unclassified implies that the size of the banking organization could not be determined, since it was unidentified 
in the bank-firm match.
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Table H
Variable Descriptions and Means
VARIABLE 
Dependent Variables 
Likelihood o f Credit
Credit Balances
Total banks
Primary banks 
Credit Limits
Total banks
Primary banks
Levels o f Credit
Balance to Revenue
Total banks
Primary banks 
Limits to Revenue
Total banks 
Primary banks
Description
A dichotomous variable equaling one if the firm has an 
outstanding bank loan balance with any bank (1462 
firms), zero otherwise
A dichotomous variable equaling one if the firm has an 
outstanding loan balance with the firm’s primary bank 
(1163 firms), zero otherwise
A dichotomous variable equaling one if the firm has a 
credit limit with any bank (1695 firms), zero otherwise. 
This differs from bank balances in that it includes un­
drawn lines of credit
A dichotomous variable equaling one if the firm has a 
credit limit with with the firm’s primary bank (1402 
firms), zero otherwise. It includes un-drawn lines of 
credit.
Outstanding balance on all the firm's bank loans 
(mortgages, motor vehicles, equipment, lines of credit, 
other) at all source banks divided by total revenue of the 
firm
Same as above except credit is only from the firm's 
primary bank~i.e., the bank the firm considers to be its 
most important provider of financial services
Total credit limit on all the firm's bank loans including 
un-drawn lines of credit (mortgages, motor vehicles, 
equipment, lines of credit, other) at all source banks 
divided by total revenue of the firm
Same as above except credit is only from the firm's 
primary bank—i.e., the bank the firm considers to be its 
most important provider of financial services
N
3491
3491
Mean Std.
.3491 .0095
.3173 .0092
3491
3491
.4278 .0098
.3273 .0093
1448
1330
.4768 .0599
.4566 .0560
1680
1389
.5289 .0608
.4319 .0550
Table II
Variable Descriptions and Means (continued)
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VARIABLE 
Independent Variables Description N’ Mean^ Std.‘
Firm Characteristics
Firm age 0 - 7 years A dummy (0,1) variable for the youngest third of firms.
The omitted variable is firms established for more than 16 1448
.3076 .0156
years 3491 .3701 .0097
Firm age 8 -16 years A dummy (0,1) variable for the middle third of firms. The
omitted variable is firms established for more than 16 1448 .3726 .0164
years 3491 .3362 .0095
1 - 3 employees Measures firm size with a dummy (0,1) variable for the
smallest third of firms in terms of number of workers,
inclusive of sole proprietor. The omitted variable is firms 1448 .3349 .0163
larger than 10 employees 3491 .5137 .0099
4-10  employees Measures firm size with a dummy (0,1) variable for the
middle third of firms. The omitted variable is firms larger 1448 .4076 .0165
than 10 employees 3491 .3304 .0096
minority owned A dummy variable if the primary owner—i.e., having the 1448 .0698 .0055
largest percent, is an ethnic minority. 3491 .0947 .0030
D&B Credit Score A continuous variable fi-om zero to 100, with 100
representing the strongest credit rating determined by 1448 51.68 .9716
Dunn & Bradstreet. 3491 51.05 .5553
bankmptcy in past 7 years A dummy variable if the primary owner or the firm 1448 .0158 .0045
declared bankruptcy within the last seven years. 3491 .0244 .0030
Profit per asset 1448 .0003 .0002
The profit o f the firm normalized by the firm's assets. 3491 .0046 .0036
1998 sales>1997 sales A dummy variable of 1 if the firm's current year's sales are 1448 .6577 .0159
greater than prior year. 3491 .6080 .0098
Standard Industrial Codes (SIC) as determined by the
Census Bureau
Constmction A dummy variable for the firm industry. Omitted 1448 .1527 .0129
variable is services 3491 .1186 .0068
Manufacturing A dummy variable for the firm industry, Omitted 1448 .0949 .0093
variable is Services 3491 .0846 .0055
Trade A dummy variable for the firm industry, wholesale or 1448 .2841 .0152
retail trade; the omitted variable is services 3491 .2649 .0089
Real Estate & Transportation A dummy variable for the firm industry, Omitted 1448 .1070 .0106
variable is Services 3491 .1012 .0061
Due to different number of observations for each dependent variable for conditional levels of debt, there are four subsets of 
means for the independent variables associated with each regression--total bank balances, primary bank balances, total bank 
limits, primary bank limits. Only total bank balances are reflected, since they are very similar to the remaining three. Full 
subsets will be furnished at the request of the author. The mean for the sample size N=3491 represents the mean for the 
variables in the selection (probit) regression.
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VARIABLE
Independent Variables
Source bank Variables
Years with bank^
miles to nearest bank used^
Log of Total Org Assets^
at least one unit bank used^ 
at least one mbhc used^
BHC assets * unit bank
Bank Market Variables
Table II
Variable Descriptions and Means (continued)
Description
For multiple banks this represents an average
The number of years the firm has had at least one 
financial service provided by the bank
The natural log of the assets of the banking 
organization—the consolidated holding company.
A dummy variable if at least one of the bank credit 
providers is a unit bank
A dummy variable if at least one of the bank credit 
providers is a member of a multi-bank holding 
company
The unit bank dummy variable interacted with the 
total assets of the bank holding company. This is to 
capture behavioral differences between unit banks 
that are members of small versus large bank 
organizations.
Mean^ Std.^
1448 8.926 .2828
The number of miles fi-om the firm's headquarters to 
the nearest and most fi*equently used bank office 
(branch). 1448
1448
1448
1448
8.236 3.272
15.454 .1670
.0672 .0085
.7144 .0156
1448 .9556 .1206
Herfindahl index- 
1998 100% bank
Log of Avg Org Asset in 
MSA/county
% mult bhc in msa/county 
% unit-banks in msa/county
An index based on local market deposits of all 
banking offices located in the county for a rural area 
and MSA for an urban area. It is computed by 
summing the square of each bank's market share.
The variable is continuous with a high number 
implying the market is concentrated—i.e., containing 
very few banks. 3491
This is the natural log of the average assets of all the 
banking organizations in the local market. 3491
This is a percentage of multi-bank holding companies 
within the local bank market. 3491
This is a percentage of unit banks (single-office or 
no-branch banks) within the local bank market. 3491
.2090 .0022
15.706 .02909
.3483 .0032
.1444 .0025
 ^For multiple banks this is an average of all banks, otherwise it is the primary bank
Due to different number of observations for each dependent variable for conditional levels of debt, there are four 
subsets of means for the independent variables associated with each regression—total bank balances, primary bank 
balances, total bank limits, primary bank limits. Only total bank balances are reflected, since they are very similar 
to the remaining three. Full subsets will be furnished at the request of the author. The mean for the sample size 
N=3491 represents the mean for the variables in the selection (probit) regression.
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Table III A
Total Banks and Primary Banks Regressions- -Balances
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
Firm Characteristics
Firm age 0 - 7  years 
Firm age 8 - 1 6  years 
1 - 3 employees 
4 - 1 0  employees 
minority owned 
D&B Credit Score 
Bankruptcy in past 7 years 
Profit per asset 
1998 sales>1997 sales 
Construction
Balance to Balance to
Balance to Balance toRevenue Revenue Revenue
LEVELS
Primary
Banks
Revenue
SELECT
Primary
Banks
LEVELS SELECT
Total Total
Banks Banks 
0.383 
(0.157)**
0.024 
(0.109)
0.302 
(0.153)**
0.041 
(0.147)
0.577 
(0.414)
-0.002 
(0.002)
0.052 
(0.309)
-6.107 
(3.436)*
-0.176 
(0.138)
-0.470
(0.147)*** (0.070)*** (0.136)*** (0.073)***
-0.129 0.292 -0.095
(0.058)** (0.140)** (0.059)
0.091 0.027 0.083
(0.054)* (0.119) (0.056)
-0.888 0.126 -0.791
(0.049)*** (0.170) (0.051)***
-0.338 -0.064 -0.337
(0.047)*** (0.172) (0.050)***
-0.201 0.785 -0.160
(0.064)*** (0.472)* (0.065)**
-0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)**
-0.323 0.033 -0.060
(0.175)* (0.220) (0.153)
-3.628 -3.686 -3.916
(2.845) (2.714) (3.904)
0.183 -0.252 0.100
(0.045)*** (0.139)* (0.046)**
0.324 -0.414 0.288
Manufacturing -0.435 0.082 -0.320 0.158
(0.159)*** (0.076) (0.156)** (0.076)**
Trade -0.373 0.101 -0.191 0.091
(0.177)** (0.054)* (0.163) (0.055)*
Real Estate & Transportation -0.043 0.169 0.141 0.091
(0.200) (0.076)** (0.201) (0.079)
Source Bank Characteristics
Years with bank^ 0.001 
(0.004)
- 0.000 
(0.000)
0.016 
(0.017)
-0.511 
(0.333)
-0.270 
(0.251)
-0.020 
(0.022)
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; standard errors in parentheses 
 ^For multiple banks this is an average of all banks, otherwise it is the primary bank
miles to nearest bank used 
Log of Total Org Assets ‘ 
at least one unit bank used^ 
at least one mbhc used^ 
Unit bank * BHC assets^
- 0.010
(0.005)
- 0.000
(0.000)
- 0.001
(0.011)
-0.117
(0.633)
-0.318
(0.193)*
- 0.011
(0.056)
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Table III A
Total Banks and Primary Banks Regressions—Balances (Continued)
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
BANK MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
Balance to 
Revenue
SELECT
Total
Banks
Primary
Balance to 
Revenue
SELECT
Primary
Banks
herfmdahl index-1998 100% bank
Log of Avg Org Asset in MSA/county 
% mult bhc in msa/county
% unit-banks in msa/county
-0.062
(0.195)
-0.081
(0.018)***
0.530
(0.144)***
-0.565
(0.204)***
-0.249
(0.209)
-0.070
(0.018)***
0.571
(0.144)***
-0.673
(0.216)***
Constant
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
0.657 1.202 0.932 1.039
(0.252)*** (0.311)*** (0.355)*** (0.318)*** 
3491 3491 3491 3491
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table III B
Total Banks and Primary Banks Regressions—Limits
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
Firm Characteristics
Firm age 0 - 7  years
Firm age 8 - 1 6  years
1 - 3 employees
4 - 1 0  employees
minority owned
D&B Credit Score
bankruptcy in past 7 years
Profit per asset
1998 sales>1997 sales
Construction
Manufacturing
Trade
Real Estate & Transportation
Source Bank Characteristics
Years with bank^
Limit to 
Revenue
LEVELS
Total
Banks 
0.367 
(0.140)*** 
0.107 
(0.124) 
0.350 
(0.155)** 
0.022 
(0.140) 
0.456 
(0.359) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.007 
(0.309) 
-0.130 
(0.031) 
-0.268 
(0.152)* 
-0.488
Limit to 
Revenue
SELECT
Total
Banks
-0.173
(0.055)**’*
0.109
(0.051)**
-1.035
(0.045)**’*
-0.433
(0.043)**”
-0.205
(0.059)**”
0.001
(0.001)
-0.457
(0.178)**
0.399
(0.139)**'
0.204
(0.043)**'
0.379
-0.447 0.053 
(0.162)*** (0.073) 
-0.419 
(0.176)**
-0.069 
(0.194)
0.133
(0.052)**
0.230
(0.071)***
Primary Primary
Limit to Limit to
Revenue Revenue
LEVELS SELECT
Primary Primary
Banks Banks
0.294 -0.222
(0.131)** (0.059)***
-0.015 0.089
(0.110) (0.055)
0.139 -1.011
(0.164) (0.051)***
-0.073 -0.462
(0.172) (0.048)***
0.623 -0.196
(0.436) (0.066)***
-0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
0.012 -0.520
(0.204) (0.200)***
-0.126 0.475
(0.030)**”'(0.132)***
-0.236 0.142
(0.144) (0.046)***
-0.329 0.365
(0.146)** (0.071)***
-0.255 0.136
(0.167) (0.078)*
-0.150 0.168
(0.158) (0.056)***
0.140 0.108
(0.193) (0.079)
0.005 -0.008
(0.004) (0.004)*
- 0.000 - 0.000
(0 .000) (0.000)
0.011 0.006
(0.014) (0.016)
-0.713 -0.190
(0.288)** (0.591)
-0.198 -0.379
(0.211) (0.236)
0.036 -0.006
(0.019)* (0.053) 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; standard errors in parentheses 
 ^ For multiple banks this is an average of all banks, otherwise it is the primary bank
miles to nearest bank used^ 
Log of Total Org Assets^
At least one unit bank used^ 
At least one mbhc used^ 
Unit bank * BHC assets*
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Table III B
Total Banks and Primary Banks Regressions-Limits (Continued)
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
BANK MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
Limits to 
Revenue
SELECT
Total
Banks
Primary
Limits to 
Revenue
SELECT
Primary
Banks
Herfindahl index-1998 100% bank
Log of Avg Org Asset in MSA/county
% mult bhc in msa/county
% unit-banks in msa/county
-0.239
(0.184)
-0.077
(0.017)***
0.494
(0.139)***
-0.615
(0.193)***
-0.407
(0.203)**
-0.073
(0.018)***
0.470
(0.147)***
-0.586
(0.214)***
Constant
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
0.751 1.337 
(0.253)*** (0.294)*** 
3491 3491
0.879
(0.414)**
3491
1.161
(0.315)***
3491
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
’ For multiple banks this is an average of all banks, otherwise it is the primary bank
